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2 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES
ABSTRACT. The use of various moving average (MA) rules remains popular with financial mar-
ket practitioners. These rules have recently become the focus of a number empirical studies, but
there have been very few studies of financial market models where some agents employ technical
trading rules of the type used in practice. In this paper we propose a dynamic financial market
model in which demand for traded assets has both a fundamentalist and a chartist component.
The chartist demand is governed by the difference between current price and a (long-run) MA.
Both types of traders are boundedly rational in the sense that, based on a fitness measure such as
realized capital gains, traders switch from a strategy with low fitness to the one with high fitness.
We characterize the stability and bifurcation properties of the underlying deterministic model via
the reaction coefficient of the fundamentalists, the extrapolation rate of the chartists and the lag
length used for the MA. By increasing the intensity of choice to switching strategies, we then
examine various rational routes to randomness for different MA rules. The price dynamics of
the moving average rule are also examined and one of our main findings is that an increase of the
window length of the MA rule can destabilize an otherwise stable system, leading to more com-
plicated, even chaotic behaviour. The analysis of the corresponding stochastic model is able to
explain various market price phenomena, including temporary bubbles, sudden market crashes,
price resistance and price switching between different levels.
JEL classifications: D83, D84, E21, E32, C60.
Keywords: Moving Averages, Fundamentalists, Trend Followers, Stability, Bifurcation, Evolu-
tionary Switching.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Technical analysts, also known as “chartists”, attempt to forecast future prices by the study
of patterns of past prices and a few other related summary statistics about security trading.
Basically, they believe that shifts in supply and demand can be detected in charts of market
movements. In an environment of efficient markets, technical trading rules should not be useful
for generating excess returns. However, despite all the evidence presented in academic journals
that security prices follow random walks, and consequently that these security markets are at
least weak-form efficient, as defined by Fama (1970), the use of technical trading rules still
seems to be widespread amongst financial market practitioners.
There have been various studies of the use and profitability of technical analysis. Taylor and
Allen (1992) document the enduring popularity of the trading rules in their survey of currency
traders in London. Of the respondents, 90% replied that technical trading rules are an important
component of short-term investment strategies. Allen and Taylor (1990) suggest that this is an
important finding given the apparent ability of exchange rates to move far from fundamentals
over protracted periods of time, as documented by Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990). Earlier
empirical literature on stock returns finds evidence that daily, weekly and monthly returns are
predictable from past returns. Pesaran and Timmermann (1994, 1995) present evidence on the
predictability of excess returns on common stocks for the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial
portfolios, and examine the robustness of the evidence on the predictability of U.S. stock re-
turns. Brock et al (1992) investigate the sources of the predictability by applying the bootstrap
technique to two of the simplest and most popular trading rules, the moving average (MA) and
the trading range break rules. They find that returns obtained from buy (sell) signals are not
likely to be generated by four popular null models, the random walk, the AR(1), the GARCH-
M and the EGARCH models. They document that buy signals generate higher returns than sell
signals and the returns following buy signals are less volatile than returns following sell signals.
This asymmetric nature of the returns and the volatility of the Dow series over the periods of
buy and sell signals suggest the existence of nonlinearities in the data generating mechanism.
Recent studies, such as Lo et al (2000), Boswijk et al (2000) and Goldbaum (2003), have also
examined explicitly the profitability of technical trading rules and the implications for mar-
ket efficiency. The profit generating potential of trading rules has also been scrutinised within
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the genetic programming framework by Neely et al (1997) and by the use of artificial neural
networks by Gencay (1998) and Fernandez-Rodriguez et al (2000). Griffioen (2003) contains
extensive statistical testing of the profitability of technical trading rules, after correcting for
transaction costs and data snooping, of many stock market indices including the Dow Jones
index.
Most of the cited research has focused on empirical studies. There is also a rapidly expanding
related literature on heterogeneous agent models (HAMs) of financial markets, see e.g. the
recent surveys by Hommes (2005) and LeBaron (2005) and many references therein. Many of
these HAMs have two groups of traders, fundamentalists versus technical analysts. However,
most of these models are either complex artificial market simulation models or stylized models
in which chartists use oversimplified technical trading rules. This paper develops a simple
behavioural HAM with a group of fundamentalists and a group of chartists using a (long-run)
MA rule similar to the rules used in financial practice. The technical analysts are assumed
to react to buy-sell signals generated by the difference between a long-run and a short-run
MA. Both types of traders are boundedly rational in the sense that, based on a fitness measure
given by realized capital gains, traders switch from strategies with low fitness to ones with high
fitness. The main objectives of this paper are to analyze the stability properties of the model,
particularly in relation to the MA trading strategies, and the potential for the model to generate
complex dynamics, and to examine the impact of the MA trading rules on the market dynamics.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the following section, we focus on one of the simplest
cases when the fundamentalist demand is determined by mean reversion to the fundamental
price, while the technical analyst demand is based on the difference between current price and
a MA. Based on certain fitness measures, such as observed differences in payoffs, the traders
can make an endogeneous selection of which trading strategies to use, as in Blume et al (1994),
Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), Brock and LeBaron (1996) and Brown and Jennings (1989).
Consequently, an adaptive heterogeneous asset pricing model with a market maker scenario
is developed. In Section 3, the existence, local stability and bifurcations of the fundamental
steady state, in terms of the reaction coefficient of the fundamentalists, the extrapolation rate of
the technical analysts, the lag lengths used for the MAs, and switching intensity, are analyzed
when the lag lengths of the long MA are small. The analysis, combined with some results
on general window length for some special cases, gives us some important insights into the
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effect of increasing the length of the MA. In Section 4 rational routes to randomness, that is,
bifurcation routes to complicated asset price dynamics when the switching intensity increases,
induced by the MA rule are examined numerically. One of our main findings is that an increase
of the window length of the MA rule can destabilize an otherwise stable system, leading to more
complicated, even chaotic behaviour. Section 5 introduces a stochastic fundamental price and
noise-trader demand processes, and examines the effect of these noise processes when the prices
of the corresponding deterministic system are switching between bull and bear markets. This
non-linear stochastic model illustrates a range of phenomena observed in real markets such as
temporary bubbles, sudden market crashes, price switching between different levels and price
resistance. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. AN ASSET PRICING MODEL WITH A MARKET MAKER
Following the framework of Brock and Hommes (1998), this section sets up an asset pricing
model with different types of heterogeneous traders who trade according to different trading
rules, such as fundamental analysis and technical analysis. The market price is arrived at via
a market maker scenario in line with Beja and Goldman (1980), Day and Huang (1990) and
Chiarella and He (2003b) rather than the Walrasian scenario used in Brock and Hommes (1998)
and Chiarella and He (2002). Whilst the market maker and Walrasian auctioneer mechanisms
are highly stylized accounts of how the market price is arrived at, the former may be closer to
what is going on in real markets. To focus on the price dynamics of the trading rules, we mo-
tivate the excess demand functions of different types of traders by their trading rules directly,
rather than deriving the demand functions from utility maximization of their portfolio invest-
ment with both risky and risk-free assets (as for example in Brock and Hommes (1998) and
Chiarella and He (2002, 2003b)).
Consider an asset pricing model with only one risky asset. Let Pt be the price (cum dividend)
per share of the risky asset at time t. Let nh,t be the market fraction of type h traders at time
t with h = 1, 2, · · · , H and
∑H
h=1 nh,t = 1. Let the excess demand for the risky asset of
representative trader from type h at time t be Dht . Then the population weighted aggregate




t . We assume that prices are set period by
period via a market maker mechanism and adjusted according to the aggregate excess demand
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Dt, i.e.






where ǫt ∼ N (0, 1) captures a random excess demand process either driven by unexpected news
about fundamentals, or representing noise created by noise traders, σǫ ≥ 0 is a constant and the
parameter µ > 0 measures the speed of price adjustment (or the aggregate risk tolerance) of the
market maker to the excess demand.
For simplicity, we assume throughout this paper that there are only two types of traders:
fundamentalists and technical analysts, who in fact are the most widespread types of traders in
financial markets and whose trading strategies and excess demand functions are specified in the
following discussion. Let the market fraction of fundamentalists and technical analysts at time
t be given by, respectively, nf,t and nc,t. The population weighted aggregate excess demand Dt
at time t is then given by Dt = nf,tDft + nc,tDct , where D
f
t and Dct are the excess demands (to
be defined below) of the representative fundamentalist and technical analyst, respectively. Set
mt = nf,t − nc,t, so that nf,t = (1 + mt)/2 and nc,t = (1 − mt)/2. Using (2.1), the market
price of the risky asset is then determined by








Fundamentalists—The fundamentalists believe that the market price should be given by the
fundamental price that they have estimated based on various types of fundamental information,
such as earnings, exports, general economic forecasts and so forth. They buy/sell the stock
when the current price is below/above the fundamental price. For simplicity, we first assume
that1 the fundamental price is a positive constant P ∗ and the average excess demand of the
fundamentalists is given by Dft = α(P ∗ − Pt), where the parameter α > 0 is a combined
measure of the aggregate risk tolerance of the fundamentalists and their reaction to the mis-
pricing.
Technical Analysts—Unlike the fundamentalists, the technical analysts trade based on chart-
ing signals generated from the costless information contained in the history of the price, such
1A constant fundamental price is assumed for our stability and bifurcation analysis of the deterministic model,
while a random walk fundamental price will be introduced in Section 5 for the stochastic version of the model.
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as MAs and various other technical trading rules used in financial markets. The technical ana-
lyst average excess demand is here assumed to be based on signals generated by MAs 2. More
precisely, a MA of length L at time t is defined as maLt = (1/L)
∑L−1
i=0 Pt−i where L ≥ 1 is a
positive integer. A trading signal is defined as the difference between the current price3 and a
MA maLt , namely, ψLt = Pt −maLt . For the technical analysts, their average excess demands
are assumed to be governed by Dct = h(ψLt ), where the function h has the general properties
h(0) = 0, h′(x) > 0, xh′′(x) < 0. This corresponds to one of the very popular technical trad-
ing rules whereby technical analysts wish to be long (short) when the current price is above
(below) the MA. In this paper, we select h(x) = tanh(ax) and assume a = h′(0) > 0. Note
that this form of technical analyst excess demand function has been used in the literature (e.g.
Chiarella(1992)) and it allows us to capture some elements of the filtered MA rules. This is so
since, when a is small, the technical analysts initially react cautiously to the long/short signals,
in a sense waiting to confirm the maintenance of the change in sign of the signal. In this way
they minimize the costs incurred if the signal changes frequently in a short time period. Also,
the fact that −1 < h(x) < 1 captures the limited long/short positions, risk averting behaviour
and traders’ budget constraints.
Fitness Measure and Population Evolution—In order to introduce the adaptive behaviour of
agents, we follow the mechanism of Brock and Hommes (1998) and define the fitness functions
πf,t, πc,t as their realized net profit:
πf,t = D
f
t−1(Pt − Pt−1)− Cf , πc,t = D
c
t−1(Pt − Pt−1)− Cc, (2.3)
where Cf , Cc ≥ 0 are the costs of their strategies. When the number of agents in each group
tends to infinity, the population fractions are then updated by the well known logit model prob-









Uf,t = πf,t + ηUf,t−1, Uc,t = πc,t + ηUc,t−1, (2.5)
2There is a large practitioner literature on the way MA rules are used to generate buy/sell signals. See for instance
Pring (1991) and Neely (1997).
3More generally, the current price can be replaced by a short-run MA maSt . For mathematical tractability, we
consider the case S = 1 only in this paper and leave the study of the general case S > 1 to future work.
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and η ∈ [0, 1] measures the memory of the cumulated fitness function and β ≥ 0 is the intensity
of choice measuring how quickly agents switch between the two strategies. In particular, if
β = 0, there is no switching between strategies, while for β =∞ all agents immediately switch
to the best strategy. See Brock and Hommes (1998) for a more extensive discussion of this
switching mechanism.
A Complete Asset Pricing Model—Based on (2.2) and the above analysis, the market price
of the risky asset is determined according to















, C = Cf − Cc ≥ 0, (2.7)






t−1][Pt − Pt−1] + ηUt−1, (2.8)
with the first term representing the difference in the realized capital gains of the two strategies.
Note that we have set C = Cf−Cc which will be positive if we assume that the fundamentalists
incur greater costs than the chartists. By setting σǫ = 0, the nonlinear stochastic dynamical
system (2.6)-(2.8) becomes a nonlinear deterministic system where the price follows










In general system (2.7)-(2.9) is an L + 2 dimensional non-linear difference system. We seek
principally to understand how its dynamic behaviour is affected by the reaction coefficient α
of the fundamentalists, the excess demand function h of the technical analysts, the switching
intensity β, and in particular, the lag length L used for the MA rule.
3. STABILITY AND BIFURCATION ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider the local stability and local bifurcations of the deterministic
system (2.7)-(2.9). The main results are summarized in Proposition 3.1.
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Proposition 3.1. For the deterministic system (2.7)-(2.9), assume η ∈ [0, 1). Denote m∗ :=
tanh(−βC/2), n∗f := (1 +m
∗)/2, n∗c := (1−m
∗)/2 and α¯ := αµn∗f , a¯ := aµn∗c .
(i) There exists a unique steady state (Pt,mt, Ut) = (P ∗,m∗, 0), where P ∗ is the constant
fundamental price.
(ii) If α¯ = 1 + a¯, then the steady state price P ∗ is locally asymptotically stable (LAS) for
0 < a¯ < L. At a¯ = L, there occurs a 1 : L+ 1 resonance Hopf bifurcation4.
(iii) A necessary condition for the steady state price to be LAS is given by 0 < a¯ < L and
0 < α¯ < 2 + a¯ for even L and 0 < α¯ < 2 + L−1
L
a¯ for odd L (see Fig. 3.1).
(iv) For all L, P ∗ is LAS if (α¯, a¯) ∈ DS(α¯, a¯) := {(α¯, a¯); 2a¯ < α¯ < 2} (see Fig. 3.1).
(v) For sufficiently large L, P ∗ is unstable if a¯ > α¯ (see Fig. 3.1)5.
(vi) For L = 1, P ∗ is LAS for (α¯, a¯) ∈ D11(α¯, a¯) := {(α¯, a¯); 0 < α¯ < 2, 0 < a¯}. In
addition, flip and saddle-node bifurcations occur when α¯ = 2 and α¯ = 0, respectively
(see Fig. 3.2a).
(vii) For L = 2, P ∗ is LAS for (α¯, a¯) ∈ D12(α¯, a¯) := {(α¯, a¯); 0 < α¯ < a¯ + 2, 0 < a¯ < 2}.
Furthermore, a saddle-node bifurcation occurs when α¯ = 0, a Hopf bifurcation occurs
when a¯ = 2, and a flip bifurcation occurs when α¯ = a¯+ 2 (see Fig. 3.2b).
(viii) For L = 3, P ∗ is LAS for (α¯, a¯) ∈ D13(α¯, a¯) := {(α¯, a¯); 0 < α¯ < 23 a¯+2, a¯(2−α¯+a¯) <
3}. Furthermore, a saddle-node bifurcation occurs when α¯ = 0, a Hopf bifurcation




(ix) For L = 4, P ∗ is LAS for (α¯, a¯) ∈ D14(α¯, a¯) := {(α¯, a¯); 0 < α¯ < 34 a¯ + 2, 0 < a¯ <
4, (5a¯− 4α¯)(4 + a¯)2 < a¯(8 + 3a¯− 4α¯)2} (see Fig. 3.2d).
4Resonance bifurcations occur when the complex eigenvalues lie on the unit circle. When a¯ = L, the eigenvalues
are given by λk = e2kνpii with k = 1, 2, · · · , L and ν = 1/(L+ 1). Geometrically, the L eigenvalues correspond
to the L + 1 unit roots distributed evenly on the unit circle, excluding λ = 1. When L = 1, a flip or period-
doubling bifurcation occurs. When L = 2, the bifurcation is known as a 1:3 strong resonance, which may lead
to two sets of period three cycles with one set stable and other set unstable (e.g. Chiarella and He (2000)). For
L ≥ 2, the bifurcation is accompanied by 1 : L + 1 periodic resonances (e.g. Sonis (2000)). For L1 = L2 =
L = 3, 4, instability of the steady state leads to 1:4 and 1:5 periodic resonance bifurcations, respectively, and
similar dynamics to the 1:3 resonance bifurcation are also found. Theoretical analysis of such types of bifurcation
of higher dimensional discrete systems can be exceedingly complicated and is not yet completely understood, (e.g.
Example 15.34 in Hale and Kocak (pp. 481-482, (1991))). See Kuznetsov (2004) for an extensive mathematical
treatment of bifurcation theory.
5We would like to thank Florian Wagener for providing a proof of this result.
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A proof of Proposition 3.1 is given in the appendix. Here we discuss some underlying eco-
nomic intuition using Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrating the (in)stability regions and the bifurca-
tion curves. Result (i) of Proposition 3.1 assures that the fundamental price is the unique steady
state price and the population fractions of the fundamentalists and chartists at the steady-state
are given by n∗f and n∗c , respectively. Obviously, n∗f = n∗c = 0.5 when C = 0. However, if
C > 0, that is costs for fundamentalists’ strategies exceed the costs for technical trading rules,
then there are more chartists than fundamentalists at the steady state, i.e., n∗c ≥ n∗f .
Both parameters α¯ = αµn∗f and a¯ = aµn∗c play an important role in determining the stabil-
ity/instability of the fundamental price. The market maker’s price adjustment speed µ shows
up as a scaling factor in (α¯, a¯). Given this scaling factor, α¯ and a¯ are determined by the pop-
ulation weighted (at the steady state) reaction coefficients of the fundamentalists and chartists,
respectively. Intuitively we would expect the fundamentalists to represent a stabilizing force
and the activities of the chartists to destabilize an otherwise stable market price. The results
of Proposition 3.1 describe how the (local) stability of the market depends on the balance of
these forces (captured by α¯ and a¯) and the lag length of the MA, as we explain in the following
discussion.
Result (ii) of Proposition 3.1 relates to the stability of the fundamental price along the line
α¯ = 1 + a¯, for general L, as illustrated in Fig. 3.1. This line plays an important role in the
stability analysis of the model. Along this line, the stability region is proportionally enlarged
as the lag length of the MA process (L) increases. For fixed lag L, the stability line segment
α¯ = 1 + a¯ for 0 < a¯ < L is part of the stability region in the (α¯, a¯) parameter plane. To see the
economic intuition behind this result, let us examine the price behaviour near the fundamental
price. The linearization of (2.6) reduces to Pt+1 = Pt+α¯(P ∗−Pt)+a¯(Pt−mat), or equivalently,
in deviations Xt := Pt − P ∗ from the fundamental price






Along the line 1+a¯ = α¯, the stabilizing force from the fundamentalists (α¯) and the destabilizing
force from the chartists (1 + a¯) just balance each other. Accordingly, along this line, equation
(3.1) becomes Xt+1 = −(a¯/L)
∑L−1
i=0 Xt−i and stability of the fundamental price is determined
exclusively by the MA process. In this case, the stability region of parameter a¯ is enlarged as
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the lag for the MA increases. More precisely, local stability is achieved when a¯/L < 1 (see
Chiarella and He (2000) for the mathematical proof of this result).
Based on the above analysis, we may conjecture that the stability region is enlarged as the
lag length L increases. However this conjuncture is not true in general and this becomes clear
from the results for L = 1, 2, 3 and 4. Certainly, a longer MA does reduce the impact of
a single period event on chartists’ beliefs (and so stabilizes the price process), however the
contained price information becomes less significant as the lag length increases. Hence, when
both the stable and unstable forces are balanced, as we have just discussed, the stability of
the market price is maintained. However, when such forces become unbalanced, particularly
with large a¯, sudden shifts in demand can trigger an unstable fundamental price, leading to
price overshooting, as the lag length increases. This observation is basically the underlying




α¯ = 2 + a¯a¯ = L
α¯ = 2 + a¯(L− 1)/L
1
1 2
α¯ = 1 + a¯
α¯ = a¯
DS
FIGURE 3.1. The common stability region DS for general lag length L and
necessary stability boundaries a¯ = L, α¯ = 2 + a¯ for even lag L and α¯ =
2 + a¯(L − 1)/L for odd lag L. On the horizontal (vertical) axis we have the
population weighted reaction coefficient of the fundamentalists (chartists) at the
steady state, i.e. α¯ := αµn∗f , a¯ := aµn∗c .
Given the mathematical difficulty in determining the local stability conditions for general
lag length L in the α¯ and a¯ parameter space, it is useful to have some information about the
potential unstable regions and common stable regions for all lags. Result (iii) in Proposition
3.1 give us necessary conditions for stability. In other word, the fundamental price is unstable
outside the regions that are bounded on the right by the two dotted lines and above by a¯ = L in
Fig. 3.1. Result (iv) give us sufficient conditions for the stability in terms of a¯ and α¯ for general
6The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee to bringing this point to our attention.
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lag length L, and the common stability region DS is illustrated in Fig. 3.1. It indicates that,
for all lag length L, the fundamental price is stable when the population weighted coefficients
of fundamentalists and chartists are balanced and bounded (i.e. 2a¯ < α¯ < 2). On the other
hand, when the coefficient of the chartists exceeds that of the fundamentalists, result (v) shows
that increasing the lag length L in the end destabilizes the system and this is a more interesting
result. The intuition for this instability result is the following. Chartist demand depends on the
difference between the long-run MA and the current price. As L increases, the MA becomes
smoother and more sluggish. When a¯ > α¯, the relative effect of chartists at the steady state
is bigger than that of fundamentalists, a small change in the price leads to a relatively large
increase of chartists demand destabilizing the price.
For L = 1, 2, 3, 4, Proposition 3.1 describes explicitly the regions of LAS in the (α¯, a¯) plane
and the bifurcation behaviour at the boundaries of those regions where local asymptotic stability
turns to instability. These regions are illustrated in Fig. 3.2.
For L = 1, the technical analysts have no impact on the market price. We go back to the set
up of the model and let mt = 1. Consequently, the price equation is simplified to Pt+1 − P ∗ =
[1 − αµ](Pt − P
∗). Hence the stability condition is given by 0 < α¯ < 2, where α¯ = µα is
the product of the speed of the price adjustment of the fundamentalists towards the fundamental
price (α) and the speed of price adjustment of the market maker (µ). Thus the stability of the
steady state price P ∗ is maintained only when the under(over)-reaction from the fundamentalists
is balanced by the over (under)-reaction from the market maker. The over-reaction from both
may lead to price overshooting, through a flip bifurcation when α¯ = 2.
For L = 2, the stability region D12 and bifurcation boundaries are plotted in Fig. 3.2(b) in
the (α¯, a¯) parameter plane. The Hopf bifurcation boundary is defined by a¯ = 2 and α¯ ∈ (0, 4).
For L = 3, the stability region D13 and the bifurcation boundaries are plotted in Fig. 3.2(c).
Different from the previous two cases, the Hopf bifurcation now depends on both parameters α¯
and a¯. For L = 4, the stability region D14 is plotted in Fig. 3.2(d).
For comparison all stability regions D1L for L = 1, 2, 3 and 4 are plotted in Fig. 3.2(e). The
changes of the local stability regions as L increases are in line with our previous discussion
concerning the stability near the line 1 + a¯ = α¯. As L increases, sudden shifts in demand can
trigger an unstable price when the reaction speeds are unbalanced.

















































FIGURE 3.2. Stability regions and bifurcation boundaries for (a) L = 1, (b) L =
2, (c) L = 3, (d) L = 4 and (e) comparison of stability regions and bifurcation
boundaries D1L for L = 1, 2, 3, 4. On the horizontal (vertical) axis we have the
population weighted reaction coefficient of the fundamentalists (chartists) at the
steady state, i.e. α¯ := αµn∗f , a¯ := aµn∗c .
Given the large variety of MA rules used in financial markets and the difficulty of eigenvalue
analysis for high-order characteristic equations, it is not clear how different MA rules influence
the stability of the steady state price and types of bifurcation that may occur. However the
analysis has given some important insights into the fact that local asymptotic stability depends
on some subtle balance between the reaction coefficients of fundamentalists and technical ana-
lysts. Based on our analysis, we conjecture that as the lag length L increases, the stability region
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tends to shrink towards, but stretch along, the line α¯ = 1+ a¯ with common stability region DS .
This conjecture is partly verified by the numerical simulations in the following section.
Our stability analysis also yields insight as to how the other parameters, the price adjustment
factor µ, the intensity of choice β, the cost difference C between fundamental and technical
trading strategies and the lag length L affect the local stability of the fundamental steady state.
Increasing the price adjustment factor µ moves the point (α¯, a¯) in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 in the
North-East direction leading either to a flip bifurcation (when the population weighted reaction
coefficients of the fundamentalists is relatively large) or to a Hopf-bifurcation (when the popu-
lation weighted reaction coefficient of the chartists is relatively large). WhenC > 0, an increase
in β leads to an increase in n∗c , the fraction using the cheap technical trading strategy. Hence,
for C > 0, an increase in β moves a¯ upwards and α¯ downwards, so that the point (α¯, a¯) in
Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 moves in the North-West direction and the fundamental steady state may lose
stability through a Hopf bifurcation. When there is no cost difference between fundamental and
chartist strategies, an increase in β does not change a¯ and α¯, so there is no change in the local
stability of the steady state. Furthermore increasing C is similar to increasing β. Finally, the
fact that the stability regions become more narrow for higher lags L suggests that an increase in
L may destabilize the system, especially when a¯ > α¯, i.e. the relative impact of chartists at the
steady state is larger than that of the fundamentalists. The global dynamics, for different values
of the intensity of choice and the lag length L, will be investigated in section 4.
4. DYNAMICS OF THE NONLINEAR SYSTEM
In this section, we examine the global dynamics of the nonlinear system (2.7)-(2.9) by focus-
ing on the effects of the switching intensity (Subsection 4.1) and of the lag length of the MA
(Subsection 4.2).
4.1. The Effect of The Switching Intensity—Rational Routes to Randomness. Brock and
Hommes (1997, 1998) have proposed simple Adaptive Belief System to model economic and
financial markets, where agents adapt their beliefs over time by choosing from different pre-
dictors or expectations functions, based upon their past performance as measured by realized
profits. Brock and Hommes (1998) show that, as the intensity of choice to switch to better
strategies increases, the model is able to generate the entire “zoo” of complex behaviour from
local stability to high order cycles and even chaos and this is the so-called Rational Routes to
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Randomness (RRR for short). In this section, we consider the effect of the switching inten-
sity on the price dynamics of the deterministic system (2.7)-(2.9) with two different MAs using
L = 4 and L = 100. We choose the parameter set α = 1, µ = 2, η = 0.2, a = 1, C = 1.
Note that for β = 0, we have α¯ = αµn∗f = 1 and a¯ = aµn∗c = 1, so that for L = 4 and
β = 0, according to Proposition 3.1 (ix) the fundamental price P ∗ is locally stable. On the
other hand, since C > 0, for β = ∞, we have α¯ = αµn∗f = 0 and a¯ = aµn∗c = 2, so that for
L = 4 and β = ∞, according to Proposition 3.1 (ix) the fundamental steady state is unstable.
As the switching intensity β increases we therefore expect that the fundamental steady state
becomes unstable by a Hopf bifurcation. This is indeed confirmed by numerical simulations
as illustrated by the phase plots (Pt,mt), for different values of β = 0.2, 0.3, 0.49, 0.52, 0.555
and 0.57 in Fig. 4.1. It is found that, once the fundamental price P ∗ becomes unstable, the
solutions converge to figure-eight shaped attractors for low switching intensity (e.g. the cases
of β = 0.2 and 0.3). Recall that for L = 4 we have a 6-dimensional system, and the figure-
eight shaped attractors are in fact 2-dimensional projections of an invariant circle around the
unstable fundamental steady state in the 6-dimensional phase space. As the switching intensity
increases, the figure-eight shaped attractor grows initially (for β = 0.3, 0.35) and then stretches
to a scissors-shaped attractor (for β = 0.49). As the intensity increases further, the simple
attractor becomes more complicated (for β = 0.52) and eventually leads to strange attractors
(for β = 0.555 and 0.57). One can see that the market price variation increases as the switching
intensity increases. It is interesting to note that these patterns are similar to the rational routes
to randomness studied extensively in Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998).
Insert Figure 4.1 Here
FIGURE 4.1. Phase plots of (mt, Pt) for L = 4 and various β =
0.2, 0.3, 0.49, 0.52, 0.555 and 0.57.
For L = 100, β = 0, we have α¯ = αµn∗f = 1 and a¯ = aµn∗c = 1 and we conjectured earlier
that this point lies outside the stability region for L large and this is confirmed by numerical
simulations for L = 100. To illustrate the effect of the switching intensity β, we include phase
plots, in terms of (Pt,mt), for different values of β = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.35, 0.42, 0.45 and
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0.4652 in Fig. 4.2. As β increases, the (projection of the) attractor starts with narrow figure-
eight shapes (for β = 0.05 and 0.1) and is then stretched (or extrapolated) by the technical
analysts towards the extreme high/low price levels (for β = 0.2). The attractors are then broken
down to Lorenz-like attractors, similar to those of the celebrated 3-dimensional continuous
Lorenz system, see Peitgen et al (1992)) for β between 0.3 and 0.35. As the switching intensity
increases further, the Lorenz-like attractors merge into one connected strange attractor (for β =
0.42) and then to strange attractors (for β = 0.45 and 0.4652). Also, as the switching intensity
increases, the volatility of both price and population increases.
Insert Figure 4.2 here
FIGURE 4.2. Phase plots of (mt, Pt) for L = 100 and various β =
0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.35, 0.42, 0.45 and 0.4652.


























FIGURE 4.3. Price time series for L = 100 and β = 0.1 (a), 0.3 (b), 0.35 (c),
0.42 (d) and 0.46 (e).
The corresponding price time series are illustrated for β = 0.1, 0.3, 0.35, 0.42 and 0.46 in
Fig. 4.3. One can see that an increase of the switching intensity can generate very interesting
price patterns. With a lower switching intensity (β = 0.1), the fundamental price is unstable
and extrapolation of the price trend by the technical analysts pushes the price away from the
fundamental price. Because of their limited long/short position, their fitness or utility becomes
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smaller when they reach their limit position. This leads traders to switch back to the funda-
mental strategy, bringing price back towards the fundamental price. Because of the increase of
the fitness of the technical analysts, the price is pushed further beyond the fundamental price to
the opposite extreme. As the switching intensity increases (for β = 0.3, 0.35), such switching
from high/low extreme to low/high extreme happens very quickly. At the same time, the price
becomes more volatile. This result can be used to explain regular boom and bear markets. As
the intensity increases further, the regular switching pattern of the price between two extreme
levels is destroyed, leading to highly volatile price patterns (for β = 0.46). This phenomenon
of the price switching between upper and lower levels gives some economic basis to the notion
of upper and lower resistance levels that are frequently discussed in the practitioner literature
on technical analysis (see e.g. Pring (1991)).
4.2. The Effect of the Lag Length—Dynamics of The Moving Average. We now consider
the effect of the lag length L of the MA rule on the price dynamics of the deterministic system
(2.7)-(2.9). As an illustrative example, we choose the parameters α = 1, µ = 2, β = 0.4, η =
0.2, a = 1, C = 0, for which α¯ = 1 and a¯ = 1. The fundamental price is locally stable for
L = 2, 3, 4, but it is unstable for L ≥ 5. Fig. 4.4 illustrates how the phase plot (in terms of
(Pt,mt)) changes as the lag length L increases.
Insert Figure 4.4 here
FIGURE 4.4. Phase plots of (mt, Pt) for fixed β = 0.4 and various L =
5, 8, 9, 10, 50, 90 and 100.
For L = 5, the (2-D projection of the) attractor is given by a figure-eight shaped closed curve
with small price variation (about 1% of the fundamental price level) and there is a tendency
among traders to switch from fundamental analysis to technical analysis. For L = 8, the size
of the attractor is enlarged, implying that the deviations of both price and population from the
fundamental value, which is P ∗ = 100 and n∗c = n∗f = 0.5, are enlarged. Hence an increase
in the MA window L destabilizes the price dynamics. This destabilizing effect becomes more
significant when L is increased further to L = 9, 10, 50 and the price dynamics become even
more complicated for L = 90 and 100, as indicated by the phase plots in Fig. 4.4.
In order to get more insight into these destabilizing effects of the long-run MA, let us examine
the time series of prices and corresponding MAs in Fig. 4.5. It is found that, following a cross
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FIGURE 4.5. Price time series for fixed β = 0.4 and various L = 5, 10, 50 and 200.
over of the long run MA and the market price, both the technical analysts and fundamentalists
take the same long/short position initially, but soon after they take opposite positions. This helps
to accentuate either the up or the down trend, pushing the price to either a higher or a lower level
initially, but soon after, their different positions slow down the trend built up initially and bring
the price back towards its fundamental level. The time taken for the price to return back to
its fundamental value is proportional to the lag L. When the lag L for the MA is small, the
reversion back to the fundamental happens quickly; as L increases, this reversion takes a longer
time.
The destabilizing effect of the lag length L holds in general for the parameters located within
regions in which the fundamental price is locally stable for lower lags and unstable for higher
lags, as discussed in the above. However, this may not always be the case. As a matter of
fact, when the reaction coefficients from both types of traders are carefully balanced (such that
α¯ = 1+ a¯), an increase of the lag length can stabilize an otherwise unstable system, as indicated
in Proposition 3.17.
7Numerical simulations (not reported here) indicate that, in this case, an increase in L can cause an explosive
system to become a (locally) stable system.
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5. TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF THE STOCHASTIC MODEL
The nonlinear dynamic model considered in the previous sections can be treated as the de-
terministic skeleton of the corresponding stochastic model. The prices observed in real markets
are presumably the outcome of the interaction of both non-linear and stochastic elements. Rig-
orous analytical tools for the analysis of non-linear stochastic dynamical system are still in a
development phase (see e.g. Arnold ((1998)) for an up-to-date account). The analytical results
that exist deal mainly with affine systems so it seems difficult at the moment to apply these tools
to our nonlinear model. In this section we attempt to gain some insights into the behaviour of
the nonlinear stochastic model through numerical simulations.
Recall from Section 2, Eq. (2.1) that we already introduced a noise term ǫt representing
noise created by noise traders. In addition to noisy demand, we also introduce a random walk
fundamental price process. We assume that the fundamental price follows a random walk
P ∗t+1 = P
∗
t [1 + σδ δt], (5.1)
where σδ ≥ 0 is a constant measuring the volatility of the return and δt ∼ N (0, 1). Notice that
this specification ensures that relative price changes are stationary.
To illustrate a typical example, we select the parameters α = 0.5, β = 0.3, a = 1, µ = 1, η =
0.2, C = 1, L = 100, P ∗0 = P0 = $100. To see the effect of the two noise processes on the
price dynamics of the deterministic model, we compare four different cases in terms of (σǫ, σδ):
(a) (0, 0), (b)(σǫ, 0), (c) (0, σδ) and (d) (σǫ, σδ) with σǫ = 0.5% and σδ = σ/K, σ = 5%
per annum and K = 250 (corresponding to 250 trading days per year). The comparison is
conducted over the first 500 time steps (a trading period of about 2 years). In all three noise
cases, Fig. 5.1 (panel A) compares the market price Pt, together with the fundamental price and
the long-run MA, Fig. 5.1 (panel B) compares the difference of the market population fractions
mt = nf,t − nc,t, and Fig. 5.1 (panel C) compares the demand functions of the fundamentalists
and the technical analysts.
Case (a) reduces to the corresponding deterministic case. In this case, the constant funda-
mental price P ∗ = 100 is unstable and the market price Pt displays periodic switching between
bull and bear markets, as illustrated in Fig. 5.1 (A)-(a). From Fig.5.1(C)-(a), one can see that
the fundamentalists and the technical analysts take opposite (long/short) positions in most of
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FIGURE 5.1. Time series of the prices (A), population fraction differences
(B), and demand functions (C) for fixed L = 100 with (σδ, σǫ) = (0, 0) in (a);
(0, 0.5%) in (b); (5%p.a., 0) in (c) and (5%p.a., 0.5%) in (d). Here α = 0.5, β =
0.3, µ = 1, η = 0.2, a = 1, C = 1.
the time period. Because of limits on the position the technical analysts can take8 and the sta-
bilizing role of the fundamentalists, such off-setting positions cause the price to stay bounded.
8This may be due to their short selling constraint when they hold a short position and consumption needs when
they hold a long position.
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However the market switches when both of them have the same position and such a transition
happens very quickly. In addition, the market is dominated by the technical analysts most of
the time, as indicated by the fact that the trend of the market price in Fig. 5.1 (A)-(a) follows
closely the demand pattern of the technical analysts in Fig. 5.1 (C)-(a) and that traders tend to
switch from the steady state level to technical analysis as indicated by Fig. 5.1 (B)-(a).
Case (b) examines the effect of the noisy demand on the price dynamics. Because of this
noisy demand, the market price becomes more volatile. However, the market price (in Fig.5.1
(A)-(b)) and the demand functions (in Fig. 5.1 (C)-(b)) are still dominated by the underlying
price dynamics of the deterministic case (a), although the switching between two types of trad-
ing strategies is intensified (see Fig. 5.1 (B)-(b)), spreading betweenm = −60% andm = 60%.
Case (c) examines the effect of the noisy fundamental price on the price dynamics. One can
see from Fig. 5.1 (A)-(c) that the market price Pt closely follows the fundamental price P ∗t ,
though the variation of the market price increases (because of the strong extrapolation of the
technical analysts). Fig. 5.1 (B)-(c) shows that traders tend to switch to fundamentalist analysis
from time to time. However, a comparison of the market price trend in Fig. 5.1 (A)-(c) and the
demand function pattern in Fig. 5.1 (C)-(c) shows that the market price is above (below) the
fundamental price when the technical analysts take long (short) position. This means the market
price is still dominated by the technical analysts although it follows closely the fundamental
price.
Case (d) examines the combined effect of the two noise processes on the price dynamics.
Apart from the fact that the market price becomes more volatile (because of the noisy demand),
it shares similar features as in the cases (b) and (c). That is, the market price follows the
fundamental price and the market is dominated by technical analysts.
Based on the analysis above, we observe some interesting phenomena. (i) Adding noisy
demand can increase price volatility, but it has less impact on the price pattern and the market
conditions of the underlying price dynamics. (ii) When the fundamental price follows a stochas-
tic process, the market price closely follows the fundamental price. (iii) The market is mainly
dominated by technical analysts (when they extrapolate strongly). They may be the winners
over short time periods (indicated by the traders switching to technical analysis), however over
the whole time period they may be the losers in the sense that most of the time they buy when
the market prices are high and sell when the market prices are low. (iv) The switching between
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bull and bear markets happens when both types of traders take the same position, a very in-
tuitive result. Such transitions can be intensified with the help of the noise traders, leading to
temporary market bubbles and sudden crashes.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Within the framework of the Brock and Hommes (1998) asset pricing model with heteroge-
neous beliefs, price fluctuations are driven by evolutionary switching between different expec-
tation schemes. Various rational routes to randomness, i.e. bifurcation routes to complicated
dynamics, are observed when the intensity of choice to switch prediction strategies is high. In
their framework however, the technical trading rules are very simple and for analytical tractabil-
ity only a few lags are involved. Motivated by the popularity of MAs strategies in real markets
and empirical studies, this paper sets out to analyze the impact of long run MA rules on the
market dynamics and potentially rational routes to randomness. In our model of fundamental-
ists and technical analysts, who trade on the signals generated by the crossing of the latest price
over the long run MA, we are able to obtain some important qualitative insights into the impact
of MA rules. Intuitively one might expect that a long run MA smoothes the price dynamics
and hence an increase of the lag length of the MA might be expected to stabilize the market.
Surprisingly, our results show that, within a market maker scenario, this intuition is only true
when both the reaction coefficient α of the fundamentalists and the extrapolation rate a of the
trend followers are balanced in a certain way. In general, as the lag length L increases, the MA
becomes smoother and more sluggish. When the impact between fundamentalists and chartists
is not balanced, especially when the relative impact of chartists at the steady state is larger than
that of fundamentalists, a mall change in the price leads to a relatively large increase of chartists
demand and consequently, the lag length of the MA rule can destabilize the market price. To the
best of our knowledge, this is a new result concerning market dynamics in the presence of MA
rules. Another contribution of this paper is that for realistic MA rules with a large lag length
L, similar rational routes to randomness occur when the intensity of choice to switch strategies
increases. Finally, time series analysis of a stochastic version of our model shows the potential
to explain various market phenomena such as price volatility, bull and bear markets, temporary
bubbles and sudden crashes. In subsequent research it will be useful to study a more realistic
model of the market with a large number of different trading rules, in particular with agents
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using different MA strategies of various length, or other types of technical trading rules used in
financial practice, such as genetic algorithms and neural networks.
APPENDIX—PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1
A1. Existence and Uniqueness of the Steady-State—Proof of Part (i). The deterministic system (2.7)-(2.9) can be written as follows:
Pt+1 = F (Xt), Ut+1 = H(Xt), mt+1 = G(Xt). (A.1)
where Xt = (Pt, Pt−1, · · · , Pt−(L−1), Ut,mt) and







H(Xt) = [−α(Pt − P
∗]− h(ψLt )][F (Xt)− Pt] + ηUt, (A.3)
G(Xt) = tanh[β(H(Xt)− C)/2]. (A.4)
One can easily see that, for η ∈ [0, 1), (Pt, Ut,mt) = (P ∗, 0,m∗) is the unique steady state of the system (A.1), where P ∗ corresponds to
the constant fundamental price and m∗ = tanh(−βC/2).
A2. Characteristic Equation of the Steady-State. The characteristic equation of the system (A.1) at the steady state is given by Γ(λ) :=
λ(λ− η)ΓL(λ) = 0 where
ΓL(λ) := λ






(λL−2 + · · ·+ λ+ 1) = 0. (A.5)





























































Based on these calculations, the result follows.
A3. Proof of Parts (ii) and (iii). The proofs of (ii) and (iii) follow from the following Lemma.
Lemma.(i) If α¯ = 1 + a¯, then the eigenvalues λi of ΓL satisfy |λi| < 1 if and only if 0 < a¯ < L. In addition, for a¯ = L, the λi satisfy
λi 6= 1 and (1 − λLi )/(1 − λi) = 0. (ii) A necessary condition for |λi| < 1 for all i is 0 < a¯ < L and 0 < α¯ < 2 + a¯ for even L and
0 < α¯ < 2 + L−1
L
a¯ for odd L.
Proof. For α¯ = 1+ a¯, ΓL(λ) ≡ λL+ a¯L (λL−1+· · ·+λ+1) = 0. It follows from Chiarella and He (2002) that |λi| < 1 iff− 1L < a¯L < 1,
i.e., a¯ < L (since a¯ > 0). In general, following from Jury’s test, necessary conditions for |λi| < 1 for all i are a¯/L < 1, ΓL(1) = α¯ > 0
and (−1)LΓL(−1) = 2− α¯+ a¯ > 0 for even L and (−1)LΓL(−1) = 2− α¯+ L+1L a¯ > 0 for odd L. 
A4. Proof of Part (iv). Let f(λ) = λL and g(λ) = −(1−α¯+a¯)λL−1+ a¯
L
[λL−1+· · ·+λ+1]. Then, on |λ| = 1, |g(λ)| < |1−α¯+a¯|+a¯
and |f(λ)| = 1. If 2a¯ < α¯ < 2, then |g(λ)| < |f(λ)| on |λ| = 1. Following from Rouche’s theorem, f(λ) and ΓL(λ) = f(λ)+ g(λ) have
the same number of zeros inside |λ| = 1. Therefore |λi| < 1 for i = 1, 2, · · · , L.
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A4. Proof of Part (v). To show that there exists at least one eigenvalue λo such that |λo| > 1 when a¯ > α¯ and L is sufficiently large, we
change variables by setting λ = 1+z/L in Γ(λ) and introduce f(z) = limL→∞ Γ(1+z/L). Note that for |z| bounded, the limit is uniform.
As L → ∞, we have λL = (1 + z/L)L → ez , λL−1 = (1 + z/L)L−1 → ez and (1/L)
PL−1
i=0 λ
i = (1/L)(λL − 1)/(λ − 1) =
[(1+zL)L−1]/z → [ez−1]/z. Hence f(z) = (α¯− a¯)ez + a¯[ez−1]/z. Note that f(0) = α¯ > 0 and that limz→∞[(ez−1)/z]/ez = 0,
therefore the first term in f dominates the second. Since α¯ − a¯ < 0, we see that for large values of z the value f(z) will be negative.
Consequently f will have a positive zero, and Γ will have a zero larger than one for L sufficiently large.
A5. Proof of Part (vi)-(ix). For L = 1, Γ1(λ) ≡ λ− (1− α¯) = 0. Hence |λ| < 1 iff 0 < α¯ < 2. Also λ = +1 for α¯ = 0 and λ = −1
for α¯ = 2.
For L = 2, Γ2(λ) = λ2 + c1λ + c2 = 0, where c1 = −(1 − α¯ + 12 a¯) and c2 =
a¯
2
. Following Jury’s test, |λi| < 1 iff π1 :=
1 + c1 + c2 = α¯ > 0, π2 := 1− c1 + c2 = 2− α¯+ a¯ > 0 and π3 := 1− c2 = 1− a¯2 > 0. Hence P
∗ is LAS if (α¯, a¯) ∈ D12(α¯, a¯).
Also, λ1 = 1 and |λ2| < 1 when π1 = 0, λ1 = −1, |λ2| < 1 when π2 = 0 and λ1,2 ∈ C, |λ1,2| = 1 when π3 = 0.
For L = 3, Γ3(λ) := λ3 − [1 − α¯ + a¯(1 − 13 )]λ
2 + a¯
3
(λ + 1) = 0. Set c1 = −[1 − α¯ + 23 a¯], c2 = c3 =
a¯
3
. Then |λi| < 1 iff
π1 := 1+c1+c2+c3 = α¯ > 0, π2 := 1−c1+c2−c3 = 2− α¯+
2
3
a¯ > 0 and π3 := 1−c2+c1c3−c23 = 1−
a¯
3
[2− α¯+ a¯] > 0. Hence
P ∗ is LAS if (α¯, a¯) ∈ D13(α¯, a¯). Furthermore, π1 = 0, π2 = 0 and π3 = 0 give the saddle-node, flip and Hopf bifurcation boundaries,
respectively.
For L = 4, Γ4(λ) ≡ λ4 − [1− α¯+ 34 a¯]λ
3 + a¯
4
(λ2 + λ+ 1) = 0. Set p = −[1− α¯+ 3
4
a¯], q = a¯
4
. Then, using Jury’s test, |λi| < 1
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are positive. It can be verified that |A| > 0, |B| > 0 iff (1 + q)2[1 + p− 2q] + q(p− 1)2 > 0 and p < 1, respectively, which leads to the
result.
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